That Seventies Show

There is a serious situation brewing that few people are talking about. This absolutely required a blog update.

One of the most dramatic features of the economic landscape during the 1970s was the disruption of the Oil Shock. Today, people are misled to believe that this was THE cause of inflation in that disastrous decade but that is a long way from the truth. In reality, it was more of a reaction to inflation. LBJ's creation of the modern welfare state combined with his escalation in Vietnam put the US on the path of permanent debt.

Accelerating inflation rapidly ensued for nearly a decade had already resulted in cumulative dollar inflation of over 50% before the Arab Oil Embargo and overnight tripling of prices. OPEC was using their market power and leverage to compensate for the falling value of the dollar and to get ahead of the galloping inflation our government and central bank had created. They noticed that they were being robbed via currency debasement and were in a position to do something about it because they controlled a large chunk of the oil export trade.

Unfortunately, we may be about to see history rhyme if not repeat in the near future. The effects could be extremely serious, with social consequences much greater than in 1974. And it could all be triggered by one medium-sized Southeast Asian nation that few people focus on when looking at economics. That nation is Thailand and the critical commodity that will be impacted is rice.

The likely result arises from the politics of inflation. Thailand's exports are priced in dollars and the severe erosion in value of the dollars earned has created pressure to increase income to revive living standards damaged by inflation. Because Thailand is the largest rice exporter by far in a tight market, they are in a position to demand higher prices - just as OPEC was in 1973-74. The current ruling party in Thailand is committed to increasing the income of farmers and is pursuing policies to control the rice supply and push up prices. From Bloomberg:

Yingluck has said the government will buy unmilled grain from farmers at 15,000 baht ($502) a ton at harvest in November, above current market rates of 9,900 baht. With Thailand the world’s biggest exporter, that may raise rice prices across a region that accounts for 87 percent of global consumption. The leader presented her economic policies to Cabinet yesterday and is scheduled to announce them publicly by Aug. 24.
...

Food makes up more than 30 percent of inflation indexes on average in Asia, according to Rabobank Groep NV. The weighting of rice in consumer-price indexes varies from 9.4 percent in the Philippines, 4.7 percent in Indonesia and 2.9 percent in Thailand, according to Bank of America.

Collateral Damage
The sad irony is that the people most affected by this will be innocent bystanders. The western central banks most responsible for currency debasement will hardly even notice. Few people in the West will be impacted at all. The people who will feel the pain will be Asian city dwellers. Middle and lower class urbanites will be especially hard hit. There will be a partial offsetting benefit in rising incomes for rice farmers but the disruption from shifting so much money from urban consumers is sure to trigger political unrest and likely a great deal of violence as well.

The numbers suggest a 50% increase in rice prices if the official Thai government pricing dictates to the world export market. This seems likely to us since they account for over a third of all rice exports nearly every year. With rice in short supply already, it is doubtful that importers will be able to refuse to buy at the higher price for very long. Because of rice consumption patterns, the effect will be overwhelmingly confined to Asia (85% of world consumption) and North Africa. As if those areas needed more economic pressure place upon them.

Once the Asian nations understand the full consequences of this move, the drive to move their economies away from the dollar should accelerate. With the dollar as the global reserve currency, the Fed is able to inflict widespread damage with its irresponsible policies. It appears the casualties in this round will be overwhelmingly Asian. That will increase the urgency to find alternatives to a dollar that is being sabotaged at the whim of Ben Bernanke.

Trembling Pillars of Fraud

Over the last two weeks we have seen a series of indications that some of the key elements supporting manipulation of market pricing mechanisms are beginning to tremble. We have seen equity prices rise despite the lack of any significant increase in profits. We have seen commodity prices spike without much increase in real demand. In our opinion the key institutions behind this mess are the major Wall Street (TARP) banks, government agencies and the Fed. They have all played a major role in creating credit inflation, with subsequent asset bubbles and debasement of our currency. But understand this: if you 'look through' each of those institutions you will find the US government backstopping each and every one of them. Each of those has come under increasing attack and as the supports have begun to shake, the fraudulent pricing they have promoted has also begun to unwind. As politics has supported bubble dynamics, so it can destroy them - live by the sword, die by the sword.


Fear and Loathing
First, Yahoo Finance reports that Wall Street's bonuses being paid out now will total $145 billion. That is greater than 1% of US annual GDP. In a normal year that number would be insane. After the disaster those same players inflicted on the US and global economy, that number is downright obscene. Bailouts were indefensible to start with and now you can add infuriating arrogance to the list of offenses. Public anger may be getting through to Congress and without siphoning off taxpayer money via the legislature, the rest of the Wall Street con game doesn't work. It has now gotten so bad that according to Dow Jones Newswire the TARP still exists only courtesy of a Senate filibuster by its supporters.

Fear of angry constituents has taken on a new urgency for our elected officials in the wake of a shocking Republican victory in the Massachusetts election for Senate. With citizens realizing that the Fed's actions have been a pure handout to Wall Street, the reconfirmation of Ben Bernanke as chairman is now very much in danger. Today, the NY Times reports that two additional senators abandoned him. With Geithner at Treasury already under serious scrutiny by Congress for his role in the bailout of Goldman via AIG and the subsequent attempt to hide the details, the two most prominent faces of bailout nation are both in danger of being forced out.


Friendly Fire
The biggest blow psychologically may be the rhetorical broadside from President Obama against the big banks that are a key leg of the credit inflation machine. His speech yesterday called for them to be cut down to size and shackled. This was a frontal attack on the concept of Too Big To Fail, with its implicit taxpayer guarantee for the stupid risks taken by big banks. The Obama Administration has given Wall Street nearly everything it wanted so the Street must now feel shocked that their tame politician has turned on them viciously. We have long felt that once the anger of the populace rose to sufficient levels, the political class would throw the financial elites under the bus in the interest of self-preservation.

Our government has betrayed our nation's citizens in many ways - from the TARP to the uncapping of taxpayer losses on Fannie and Freddie on Christmas Eve. The failure of those policies to make things better or even to stop them from getting worse is now obvious. The failure has become political kryptonite - so much so that Rep. Barney Frank is calling for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mack to be abolished. Frank has been one of their main defenders and cheerleaders for years if not decades. For him to even contemplate such a call tell us that taxpayer bailouts have become the political equivalent of Ebola.

Political support lies at the very foundation of attempts to revive the bubble by inflating credit and eroding the dollar. It is clear that this political support is evaporating before our very eyes and the state of the markets is beginning to reflect that. Suddenly the political foundation of Bailout Nation isn't looking too stable and the pillars resting on it are beginning to tremble violently.

Fractional Naked Shorting

Every dollar-denominated loan can be viewed functionally as a partial naked short position in FRNs (Federal Reserve Notes, 1.e. cash). The extent of the naked short is the inverse of the reserve ratio, so at 10% reserve, the position is written as 90% naked short. The entry is created where the bank shorts notional dollars into existence where none existed before. The Fed is a mechanism for supporting those naked shorts against margin calls that would otherwise happen in the real world - that's what a bank run really is, a margin call by lenders (depositors).

The continued existence of this naked shorting depends utterly on the willingness of the lenders to accept repayment in virtual instead of real dollars. Wire transfers, checks and book entries are all dollar substitutes, not actual dollars. An entire massive infrastructure has been erected to push people towards the conclusion that these are actually identical to FRNs. Banks will freely exchange your book entry with them for cash - until they can't anymore. The FDIC exists to guarantee that you will get cash for that book entry or other cash substitute. The Fed holds stocks of FRNs which it can exchange on a limited basis to commercial banks in danger of running out.

The scale of the pyramid scheme can be measured by the ratio of actual cash to virtual cash. Total cash in circulation (real cash) is $923 billion per the H.4.1 release dated December 10. The amount of virtual cash is the total credit outstanding, which is $52.6 TRILLION as of September 30 per the Z.1 release also dated December 10. In other words, each one dollar of cash is supporting nearly 57 dollars of credit. Through the mechanism of this gigantic naked short position, the value of the underlying security - the US dollar has been driven down to a huge extent. In fact, the short ratio can also be expressed as 98%. Not coincidentally, that is also the extent to which the US dollar's purchasing power has been reduced since the advent of the Federal Reserve.

This gives you some idea of the extent to which the value of the supply of dollars has been diluted by all of the substitutes that have been introduced into the system. If the dollar were a drug, it would be so heavily cut as to have no discernible effect. It also explains the desperation with which the financial world is attempting to save "the system" - by which they mean the machine that issues dollar substitutes and convinces you to accept them. There are sufficient dollars to cover less than 2% of domestic debt outstanding. That takes no account of the naked short positions of foreign banks. The bankers are short 57 dollars for each dollar that actually exists. You can well imagine what would happen if such a short position were to be squeezed to any significant extent.

One can justify banking to the extent than it increases productive capacity and therefore ultimately wealth. The increase in the pool of dollar substitutes will have minimal inflationary impact as that growth will be counter-balanced by an increase in the pool of goods those dollars can buy. This is a social good and one of the few philosophical reasons to support banking. Of course we are long past the point at which such banking was the norm, or even a large minority of credit activity.

Printing Currency, Not Money

This sounds like an academic distinction but it is not. Especially at times like these, knowing the difference is key to understanding the behavior of financial systems.

What is Money?
Let's start with a textbook definition of money and proceed from there. Most definitions include two parts, some add a third. According to them, money is:

1. a medium of exchange
2. a store of value
3. a standard of value or unit of account (widely but not universally accepted)

If you look closely at the first two definitions, you will see that money exists in the minds of those who use it. This is partially true for the third definition as well. (note: For all of you monetary theory geeks, please relax. These are deliberate simplifications designed to make the ideas accessible to a general audience, not a detailed exposition of precise financial models.)

1. I can exchange my money for stuff.
2. I can exchange my money for stuff later.
3. I can exchange my money for a predictable amount of stuff later.

Let's think about what is happening here. Money has value because people will give you stuff for it, both now or in the future. But why will they do that? They have to believe that they can trade it onward in turn for stuff they want. So the utility value of money is based on a set of collective beliefs - what Carl Jung referred to as the Collective Unconscious. This is the set of beliefs that are widely held by a group of people at a deep level and upon which they will act without thinking about it. One can think of this as the unstated assumptions of a society. In the US, the dollar has had a stable or relatively stable value for so long that few would ever consider NOT accepting it in exchange for stuff. The dollar as money is a deeply embedded part of our Collective Unconscious, both here and around the world.

Though there are many who are beginning to question the value of the dollar as money, the number is still miniscule as a percentage of society. Even if a person were to cease to believe in the dollar as money in their own mind, they would still accept it as long as they believed that others would accept it from them in exchange for goods. So externally, they would act as if the dollar was still money, even if they no longer held that belief. That is what puts the collective in unconscious. At some point, things deteriorate sufficiently that everyone KNOWS that everyone else is just pretending. That is the point of universal hypocracy just before the belief system breaks down.

The great Adam Smith said it well:

"All money is a matter of belief."

Printing Money?

Now we get back to the title of this entry. It is clear that from a purely physical point of view, a central bank can create as much currency (physical or electronic) as it wishes - subject of course to certain practical constraints such as logistics. But MONEY exists solely in the minds of people. It is essentially a matter of faith and faith is not something a government or central bank can print or conjure from thin air. The value of the dollar is the credibility built up over two centuries of the US Treasury always meeting its obligations. The money, is the widely held belief that the US government will guarantee that dollar holders will always be able to get things of value in return for their dollars, which is backed by generations of positive experience.

Now, please ask yourself "Does creating more currency enhance or damage that belief system?" The answer should be self-evident. The very act of creating more dollars ensures that the purchasing power of every existing dollar is diluted. There is only one scenario under which this will not damage the purchasing power of the dollar - if and only if those created dollars can be used to add a roughly comparable amount of value to the pool of available goods and services available for purchase. That is precisely the role of well-functioning credit system: to allocate capital to useful expansions of capacity and new business ventures in order to create that added value. This is why such a credit system can actually create money through credit. Because the act of printing dollars would have no such offsetting value-added, the arbitrary creation of more dollars undermines the faith which is at the root of money's very existence.

A central bank like the Fed can print currency but it cannot print belief - which is what money really is. A central bank can assist money creation by making the commercial credit system (banks) more credible with a backstop during normal times but that is a supporting role. When it takes the lead by acting unilaterally, it can only destroy money.

Printing dollars destroys money.

The Circle of Lies

Circular Money(TM): at least that's the PG-version of what several correspondents are calling it and we'll explain later. But first a little background. Quite a few folks have expressed concern about the Fed "printing" massive amounts of dollars and putting them into the economy, which will trigger inflation. This is certainly a reasonable fear given the numbers being thrown around and the rhetoric coming out of the Treasury and the Fed. However, we do not believe that the fear is well-founded and our evidence come from the Fed itself. Consider the latest report on reserve balances.

The total balance sheet has expanded by an alarming $1 trillion or 110% in 12 months - very disturbing. But the key question would be is any of this actually printed into existence? To determine this, look at the other side of the balance sheet - the liabilities and capital. Liabilities have expanded by $1,032 billion and capital by $3 billion. Liabilities mean the the assets are funded by borrowing. Real printing would go straight to capital since it creates no offsetting liability. The minuscule increase in capital is easily accounted for by interest on the Fed's bond portfolio so we may safely conclude that little or no actual printing is taking place - much less the monstrous quantities that some would suggest. So the money is being borrowed; now let's look at the liability details to see from where the incremental money is being borrowed.

• $78 billion worth of Federal Reserve Notes has been issued - increasing the amount in circulation by 10%. This is a function of demand for cash, not Fed policy. Increasing distrust of banks naturally leads to an increased preference for cash instead of deposits.
• $32 billion of reverse repos - that is the Fed borrowing from other financial institutions using its Treasury holdings as collateral
• $917 billion of "deposits" - now a deposit is a loan so this is the Fed borrowing once again. Let's break this down further:
• $216 billion is borrowed from the US Treasury - through the general and supplemental accounts
• $699 billion is from "depositary institutions" - i.e. banks.

This last one really should get your attention. You might say "I thought the Fed was lending money to the banks!?!" and you'd be right. Then the banks are turning right around and lending that money back to the Fed. It would be as if George "lent" money to Bob and then Bob turned around and "lent" that money right back to George. If the "loans" were for $1, they each now have an asset (the loan) and a liability (obligation to repay) of $1. But that is a sham transaction, whether for $1 or $1 billion. They have both expanded their balance sheet, but how much actual lending took place there? In reality, nothing changed except a meaningless book entry and the same is true with the Fed and the banks. George and Bob could exchange "loans" of $1 billion dollars and it would be just as ineffective as what the Fed has done. This is what we have dubbed Circular Money(TM).

Keep in mind, this is Circular Money(TM) only to the extent to which the entries offset and that is not a perfect match but very close. TAF loans increased by $388 billion and "other loans" (the rest of the alphabet soup) by $139 billion for a total of $527 billion vs $599 billion the banks lent to the Fed. The remainder comes from assets the banks sold to the Fed to raise cash. Clearly a large portion of the $34 billion in agency bonds and $65 billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) also was sold by banks. The money comes from the Fed and goes right back to them. Here again we see the Fed's actions in light of their attempts to maintain the deception. They started to pay interest to the commercial banks on required and excess reserves in October 2008. They are currently paying the banks 25 basis points (0.25%) on all reserves deposited with the Fed. Note that the Effective Fed Funds rate is a nearly identical 22-24 basis points. The ability to pay interest on the reserves was critical to offset the interest cost of borrowing. This way the imaginary accounting entries can be maintained nearly indefinitely with interest paid neatly offsetting interest received as well. The interest differential on huge sums of non-existent money would have unmasked the deception fairly quickly otherwise.

The Big Con
This game has no effect in reality, so what is the purpose of the Circular Money(TM) deception? It is yet another con game by the Fed to convince people that dead banks aren't really dead because Ben Bernanke says so. As long as a critical mass of people continue to buy the party line, the zombie banks will continue to lurch about spastically. We have long contended that the Federal Reserve is a very weak entity in reality and it's greatest power is that people THINK it is powerful. They announce things intended to influence the behavior of those under this illusion. They threaten to "print" in order to stoke fear of inflation and get people to act accordingly - they seem to be hoping to restart financial speculation by scaring people into draining their savings or taking on debt. But if the Fed could actually induce inflation, then we should already have it already as they've been taking radical action now for over 18 months. When the current threats fail to become reality, the already damaged credibility of the Fed will be severely compromised.

The concerns about inflation would be very serious if any actual printing were taking place but that would destroy the banking system - which is the last thing they want. As things stand, the money exists only in theory and cannot be lent outside the banking system since it doesn't really exist. In order for it to exist outside this circle of lies, the Fed would have to find a large funding source beyond the banks themselves to replace any funds the banks lend out to the economy rather than back to the Fed. They would have to compete for that funding with the Treasury who needs to borrow over $1 trillion in short order. Now do you see why the Fed prefers this deception to going to the market and trying to get that funding? If they tried and failed, it would reveal the Great Oz as the helpless little man behind the curtain that he really is.

CP to FRB ICU ASAP!

The commercial paper market certainly appears to be critically wounded. The seasonally-adjusted amount of CP has fallen dramatically since mid-September. Per the Federal Reserve the declines over the last three weeks:

September 17: -$52.1 billion
September 24: - $61.0 billion
October 1: -$94.9 billion

Headlines emphasizing funding cutoffs to companies in the real economy, like Caterpillar and A&T are highly misleading. Non-financial CP took a single hit of $18 billion ($217 billion to $199 billion) two weeks ago and has hardly budged since. The REAL story is the collapse of CP issued by banks and other financial companies. Domestic financial paper is down by $93 billion ($590 billion to $497 billion); foreign financial paper fell $40 billion ($225 billion to $185 billion, down 20%!); asset-backed paper is off $55 billion ($780 billion to $725 billion).

We have seen record withdrawals from money market recently, which has led to falling demand for commercial paper - which is usually purchased by these funds. In order to stem the flight from MM funds and hide the losses in asset-backed CP, the Fed recently extended their alphabet soup yet again. The "Asset-backed commercial paper money market mutual fund liquidity facility" or ABCPM3FLC for short was instituted just two weeks ago. It's gone from zero to $152 billion in just days - $22 billion average last week, to $122 billion average this week, to $152 billion by 10/2/08. All data are from the Fed's H.4.1 release.

Panic Lending
Actions of this magnitude clearly indicate that a major crisis is unfolding behind the scenes. The freeze in interbank lending, the explosion of LIBOR loan rates, the collapse of financial commercial paper and counter-measures taken by CBs around the world indicate that the final act of the Universal Debt Bubble may be upon us. The UDB rested entirely on confidence - and badly misplaced confidence at that. It allowed credit to be extended to those who were manifestly NOT credit-worthy and the temporarily elevated economic activity created the illusion of prosperity.

All of that is going in reverse now and the politicos don't like it. Well, unfortunately this is all necessary to return to a stable economic structure after the bankers deliberately destabilized it. One of our first blog entries was Legions of the Damned - wherein we pointed out:

Over the last several weeks, there has been a collective recognition of the inherent riskiness of using illiquid, volatile and hard to value paper as collateral for lending. The lenders are requiring either much more (paper) or better (cash) collateral to secure the loans. The result is the global "Dash for Cash" that we've seen recently. Cash is King again and the scramble to come up with it resulted in huge spikes in overnight lending rates. The injection of $150 billion into the system was designed to bring the rates back down to the ECB and Fed targets of 5.25% and 4.0% respectively.

Had the CBs not acted, there would have been massive forced selling of the illiquid paper, demonstrating it to be nearly worthless. Now that would only formally recognize a situation that already exists in reality but as long as the banks can pretend that it's worth face value, they can continue to make loans and prop up consumption. This is a classic example of Gresham's Law - to oversimplify "Bad money drives out good money." When dodgy paper assets are treated nearly the same as cash, nobody is going to put up cash.

As we surmised well over a year ago, the repricing of risk is ongoing and the current crisis is simply the big brother of the one we experienced last summer. The clearest indication of risk recognition is the explosion of spreads. Once again, according to the Fed's Commercial Paper Report, yield differentials between high-quality (AA) and lower-quality (A2/P2) commercial paper have blown out enormously - from 80 basis points (0.80%) just a few weeks ago to over 400 bp today. Then there is the spread due to implied higher risk just for being a financial company. The spread on financial vs non-financial paper has widened from 30 bp to 160 bp in just weeks. A risk that Financial Jenga readers have known about for a long time is now confirmed by the market.

Globo-shock
Inability to borrow in the US money markets helps to explain the severe dollar starvation overseas. It is this problem that the Fed is trying to fix with the their massive dollar loans (mischaracterized as "swaps") to foreign CBs. Less than a week ago, the Fed announced a $330 billion expansion of these loans.

The results of the dollar starvation are manifest across Europe. Huge institutions like Dexia, Fortis and Bradford & Bingley have been fully or partially nationalized within the last few days. It does not help that the leverage ratios of European commercial banks are typically much higher than their American counterparts. Not only are the commercial paper markets closing to such banks but elevated LIBOR rates cut those same banks off from cheap dollar loans from other banks. The squeeze to dress up balance sheets to make them look good for the quarter-end reports undoubtedly contributed to it but the fact that pressures have not abated much yesterday and today indicates that much more than a seasonal problem is at work here.

The "dash for cash" is on. Despite the Fed lending as fast as it can, commercial credit is being drained from risky financial institutions faster than the Fed and other CBs can pump it in. Having seen Wachovia, WaMu and a half-dozen European banks fail in the last week, we see no near-term end to the pressures or the bank failures.

Mayday

We turn to Europe in this commentary as important events are occurring there behind the scenes and Asia has gotten the lion's share of the attention recently. The mariner's distress call actually comes from French, where "m'aidez" simply means "help me." We thought that would be a particularly appropriate title as Europe's financial system is starting to show signs of severe distress. From the actions of the CBs over there, we can infer that the problems there may be significantly worse than here in the US. Current open market operations show that the ECB has 451 billion Euros (about $640 billion) outstanding. This dwarfs the Fed total of just over $300 billion - including all liquidity facilities. It's pretty clear that there are many European banks in deep, deep trouble.

Starving for Dollars
It is also becoming increasingly clear that the European financial system has a desperate shortage of dollars. Since much of the debt outstanding is denominated in dollars and many European banks have taken in dollar deposits as well, there is a need for them to transact in our currency that is not reciprocated. When the Fed and foreign CBs set up the currency swaps, there was some suggestion that the purpose was to give the Fed enough Euros to intervene in the currency markets. That really didn't make much sense as the Treasury and the Fed have conducted a sub rosa weak-dollar policy for years. The logical and obvious explanation is now coming to the fore - Europe is seriously short of dollars and if they were forced to go out into the market and buy dollars, our currency would strengthen too much for the planners at the Fed who have been attempting to devalue it.

The bid to cover ratios from recent auctions make the point quite forcefully. The last set of TAF auctions in the US produced ratios of 1.51 and 2.19 (for the initial 84-day facility). The comparable ECB auctions in Euros had a bid to cover of 1.58. But ECB dollar auctions were bid at 4.56 and 3.85. US banks' demand for dollars appears to be roughly equal to Eurozone banks' demand for Euros. But Eurozone demand for dollars is twice as great as either one. This trend is confirmed by the result of the Swiss dollar auctions. Those had bid to cover ratios of 2.90 and 4.90. Finally, note that the Fed is not auctioning off Euros or Swiss Francs to anxious American bankers.

In addition, the high-yield bond market in Europe is completely frozen. Not one junk issue of any size has come out of Europe this year or for quite a few months of 2007. Retail sales there are falling farther and faster than in the US and the housing bust there has barely begun. Granted that theoretically the ECB had more room to cut rates than the Fed but the strength of unions and the social program costs make a wage-price spiral much more likely in the Eurozone, which seems to be constraining the actions of the ECB.

Silent Scream

(editor's note - This blog entry was completed and posted on July 4. The entry date is showing as July 1, as the software uses the date on which the first draft was saved.)


Marc Faber was on Bloomberg TV today and he mentioned that the higher reported consumer inflation rates in Asia were a function of lower per capita GDP and a higher proportion of income spent on food and fuel - which are nearly the only prices that are rising aggressively. Common sense right? But of course that really made me start thinking - always a dangerous prospect.


Asia, Inc.

So Asia's consumer "basket" looks a lot different than that of the average American or Western European. But there are other differences as well. Many Asian nations are resource-poor, major importers of either food, raw materials or both and they depend upon exports of manufactured goods to pay for those imports. Now, let's look at the situation from a slightly different perspective. The industrial sectors of Asian economies look much like any diversified manufacturing enterprise.

Similar to our notional enterprise, these nations' factory sectors buy raw materials and energy. They employ people, paying wages in the process and sell a finished product to a customer. Substitute "import" for buy and "export" for sell and it's actually a pretty good analogy. A few differences, instead of profits, these entities collectively produce a surplus for the nation and they are also responsible for feeding and housing their workforce like an old-fashioned company town to the extent that the workforce doesn't grow its own food.So how do current conditions affect our metaphorical manufacturer? Inputs costs are rising fairly fast overall, with oil being a spectacular example though most increases are far more sedate and a fair number of industrial inputs are falling in price. Just as important, labor costs are rising. This is an obvious corollary to rising living standards and wage costs have been rising by double digits across much of Asia for years. At the same time, demand for many of their products has been weakening as their key markets (US, Europe, Japan) drop into a coordinated recession. So raising prices significantly isn't a solution as they would quickly suffer loss of market share. These factory economies are backed into a corner as surely as domestic manufacturers, with rising costs and falling demand. The Asian suppliers have the additional burden of rising labors costs on top of that. They can choose either lower revenues, lower profit margins (surplus) or some of both.

Now let's look at factors that introduce some added complexity to the model. Instead of cutting wages, nations also have the option to devalue their currency. This effectively reduces labor costs though not other inputs if they are imported. Lower "profits" can take the form of actual margin compression at the individual companies or smaller surpluses in the trade account. The factory sectors of Asia have an additional burden of the industrial surplus having to subsidize food imports - which of course are rising in price fairly quickly also.

What we see then are economies that likely will have to accept either smaller surpluses, lower corporate profits, lower wages, weaker currencies or some combination of the above.


Theory meets fact
Normally, high inflation rates tend to be associated with weakness against other currencies. Rapid declines in domestic purchasing power usually are accompanied by lower international purchasing power - again common sense. This is doubly true if the high-inflation economy does not raise interest rates to restrain demand. CPI equivalents have been high and rising across Asia for some time now, yet the currencies - like most others have been gaining vs. the dollar. To make matters worse, real interest rates in those countries are negative as well and have been for some time. Consumer prices are going up faster in most Asian economies than even the worst-case numbers here in the US - for instance John Williams at Shadow Government Statistics.

It has been odd to see such currencies rising against the dollar but there are several factors that have contributed. First was the differential in growth rates. Second was the perception of deep trouble in the US financial system combined with the impression of unstoppable rise for Asia. Third was the systemic imbalance of trade. Well, now we see that the extenuating factors are all at least beginning to falter. Growth rates are falling across Asia and we believe this is only the beginning of a very deep retrenchment there. The perception has shifted and the false impression that Asia would be immune to the problems of the US has been broken. The terms of trade are also starting to shift as fewer goods are sold to the US and other export markets. US trade deficit remains relatively flat with less of a gap with Asia being offset by higher oil prices.

In light of these factors, we are seeing high CPI and deeply negative real interest rates catching up with many Asian nations. Significant, and in some cases quite large currency reversals have taken place. One of the worst is India, where double-digit CPI, twin structural deficits and a severe slowdown are the story. With CPI pushing 12% and policy rates between 6.0% and 8.5% it's no wonder the Rupee recently reversed - down over 10% vs the dollar this year. Similar situations are brewing in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and China, not to mention Vietnam. With the exception of still-hyped China, these currencies have lost 5-14% against the dollar from their recent highs. It's taken a while but normal economic relationships seem to be asserting themselves.

As we mentioned above, these economies are in the midst of a squeeze that will push down revenues and profits as well as the currency. Despite significant drops in many regional exchanges, fundamental deterioration can drive this process much further. The potential for a currency kicker on the downside simply makes these markets even more attractive as shorts. Loss of confidence could inspire capital flight, which would devastate both the local stock markets and the currencies. Again, with the exception of China, these nations probably won't have to worry about their currencies being too strong for much longer.

The stock markets and currencies of Asia's industrializing nations are screaming but few people seem to be listening. They were key beneficiaries of the UDB and it's demise will hurt them in direct as well as indirect ways. But that is a subject for another post.


Tea Leaves
So, why does the dollar index still look so weak? The index really isn't a good indicator of the strength of the dollar against the world since it is a trade-weighted index. Note that the Euro accounts for 57.6% of the weight, with both the Pound and the Yen also in double digits. The policies of the Fed have done nothing to help the dollar but at this point, the weakness is just as much a tribute to the ambitions of the EU and Germany's near-pathological fear of inflation as they are the result of incompetence at the Fed (though there is plenty of that). I have almost nothing good to say about the Federal Reserve but they only deserve half of the credit for the decline of the dollar index.